INTRODUCTION
The fourth industrial revolution has brought new challenges related to connected systems, smart manufacturers and digital supply networks. In the last years, the need for a better integration of computation and physical processes has brought the scientific community to investigate cyber physical systems (CPSs). The term cyber physical refers to the presence of discrete processing and communication of information together with the physical engineered system (Jeschke et al., 2017) . Nowadays, CPSs are found widely in advanced manufacturing systems, transportation networks, industrial control processes, and critical infrastructures (Pasqualetti et al., 2013) . However, the increase in efficiency brought by CPSs comes at the cost of a higher risk in safety and security, due to the possibility of someone performing malicious attacks, a.k.a. cyber attacks. These attacks, usually motivated by terrorism, criminality or sabotage, exploit the system's vulnerabilities and result in some kind of disturbance or damage in the physical and in the cyber layers. The interconnected nature of Industry 4.0-driven operations means that cyber attacks have far more extensive effects than ever before, and digital systems, computers and their supply networks may not be prepared for this kind of risks (Armesto et al., 2016 , Waslo et al., 2017 . Cyber attacks are This work has been partially funded by the Spanish State Research Agency (AEI) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERFD) through the projects DEOCS (ref. MINECO DPI2016-76493) and SCAV (ref. MINECO DPI2017-88403-R) , by AGAUR of the Generalitat de Catalunya through the Advanced Control Systems (SAC) group grant (2017 SGR 482) and by the Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca. This work has been also supported by the Spanish State Research Agency through the Maria de Maeztu Seal of Excellence to IRI (MDM-2016-0656) and the grant Juan de la Cierva -Formacion (FJCI-2016-29019) . different from faults due to the fact that they do not affect only the physical layer of the CPS, but the cyber one as well.
Over the past decade, many concerns have been raised over the vulnerabilities of industrial control systems to cyber attacks. For this reason, different events and scenarios have been studied, and some diagnostic methods have been proposed and evaluated. For example, it is worth recalling the Tennessee Eastman process (Ricker, 1993) for which some experimental work was conducted in order to analyze the effects of attacks in the process control domain (Huang et al., 2009) and test the resilience against cyber physical assaults (Krotofil and Cárdenas, 2013) . Remarkable attacks to water distribution facilities, such as the one which affected the Maroochy Water Services (Queensland, Australia), have contributed to motivate research on cyber security, leading to the proposal of testbeds such as the water distribution (WADI) one (Ahmed et al., 2017) .
The availability of a benchmark for testing different diagnosis techniques is beneficial for finding the best strategies to handle undesired situations. Motivated by the successes of the wind turbine benchmark proposed by , and later enhanced by Odgaard and Johnson (2013) , and of the wind farm benchmark , which inspired several solutions to the problems of fault diagnosis (Odgaard and Stoustrup, 2012 , Simani and Castaldi, 2013 , Blesa et al., 2015 , Sanchez et al., 2015 and fault tolerant control (Badihi et al., 2014 , Blesa et al., 2014 , Odgaard and Stoustrup, 2015 , Shi and Patton, 2015 , this paper presents a benchmark based on a two-tank interconnected system useful for testing different schemes for detection and isolation of cyber attacks. In particular, the benchmark case study has been derived from a previously proposed fault diagnosis benchmark (Bouamama et al., 2001 , 2005 , Zhang, 2010 by incorporating a malicious attacker who wants to steal water from the tanks while remaining hidden through an appropriate alteration of the measurements coming from the level sensors of the tanks.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the functionality of the benchmark along with its model are described. Next, in Section 3, the attack scenarios are presented. Simulation results depicting some relevant variables in the proposed attack scenarios are shown and discussed in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
BENCHMARK DESCRIPTION
The benchmark 1 consists of two interconnected tanks, which are connected to each other through connecting pipes provided with a valve (see Fig. 1 ). The first tank, denoted as T 1 , receives water from the pump P 1 , which is controlled by a proportionalintegral (PI) controller. The interconnecting valve V b is regulated by an ON-OFF controller. On the other hand, the second tank, denoted as T 2 , is equipped with the manual outlet valve V o . The benchmark model has been derived from the one described in Bouamama et al. (2001) by incorporating a possible malicious attacker who has the goal of stealing water from the tanks while going unnoticed thanks to appropriate alterations of the outputs of the sensors, which hide the attacks. In the modified benchmark, it is assumed that the thief can extract water from the tanks using extraction pumps with flow rates Q f 1 and Q f 2 , which move the water from the tanks T 1 and T 2 to the theft tanks T f 1 and T f 2 , respectively. At the same time, it is assumed that the signals provided by the sensors are sent by wireless to the PI and ON-OFF controller, and the thief is able to hack these signals and modify them. Depending on the type of theft and the type of sensor alteration, different attack scenarios are obtained, as described in Section 3. Hereafter, the model of the benchmark is described (see Table  1 for the value of the model parameters). First, the models of the different subsystems (pump, PI controller, valves and ON-OFF controller) are provided. Then, the subsystems are merged in order to obtain the global model of the plant. Note that the superscript m is used to denote variables for which a measurement is available. Additionally, the benchmark simulator provides complementary information about the amount of stolen water volumes in tanks T f 1 and T f 2 , denoted as V f 1 and V f 2 , respectively, and the real (unaltered) values of the water levels h 1 and h 2 . However, these variables should be assumed not to be available to the attack detector.
Model of the pump Q m
p is the outflow from the pump P 1 , which is assumed to be proportional to the PI controller output U m p . Taking into account that the flow from the pump is limited by physical constraints, modeled as a standard saturation nonlinearity, then Q m p is given by
1 The benchmark is available at the URL https://cs2ac.upc.edu/en/trainingbenchmarks/cyber-attacks-benchmark-simulator Fig. 1 . Schematic diagram of the two-tank benchmark.
Model of the PI controller
The water level of the tank T 1 , denoted as h m 1 , is regulated by a PI controller, whose output is given by
1 , while the proportional and integral gain of the controller are chosen as K P = 10 −3 m −1 and K I = 5 · 10 −6 (m · s) −1 , respectively. Note that the set-point can be modified by injecting some small perturbations, which could increase the detectability of attacks, as suggested, e.g., by Scola et al. (2018) .
Model of the valve V b
The water flow Q 12 through the valve V b is controlled by an ON-OFF controller. The flow can be calculated using Bernoulli's law
is the valve position provided by the controller (0 = OFF, 1 = ON), C vb denotes the global hydraulic flow coefficient of the valve V b and h m 2 is the water level of the tank T 2 .
Model of the ON-OFF controller
The water level h m 2 is regulated by a switching controller, whose output is given by
where C vo is the global hydraulic flow coefficient of the valve V o , and U m o ∈ {0, 1} is the valve position provided by the user (0 = CLOSED, 1 = OPENED). 
Maximum outflow from the pump P 1 0.01
Flow theft from tanks T 1 and T 2 under attack 10 -4 m 3 /s h 1,re f Set point of the PI level controller 0.5 m 2.6 Global model of the system
The variation of V 1 and V 2 , which are the water volumes in T 1 and T 2 , respectively, can be calculated aṡ
where A i denotes the cross-section area of the tank T i , ∑ Q in,i is the sum of all the water inflows into the tank T i and ∑ Q out,i is the sum of all the water outflows from the tank T i .
In particular, (6) can be rewritten aṡ
Since the water levels h 1 and h 2 are limited by physical constraints, thus
System measurements
It is assumed that the available measurements are given by y m x = y x + ε yx (11) where y x ∈ {Q p ,U p , h 1 , h 2 ,U b ,U o } are the measured variables, and ε yx denotes the corresponding measurement noise. The values of the sensors noises are provided in the file init.m, located in the directory Benchmark Program Simulation, and are obtained as uniformly distributed signals.
Analytical Redundancy Relations
The benchmark is completed by residuals designed for performing a traditional fault diagnosis based on analytical redundancy relations (Staroswiecki and Comtet-Varga, 2001) , which are calculated as
Note that a discrete-time representation of (12)-(15) is obtained by applying an Euler discretization with sampling time T s = 1s.
ATTACK SCENARIOS AND DETECTION/ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS
In this benchmark, a number of attacks are considered, covering different attack policies. This section presents the different kinds of attacks affecting the physical and cyber layers (see Table 2), as well as the requirements for their successful detection and isolation. Table 2 . Attack scenarios in the benchmark.
Scenario Physical layer Cyber layer
1 × × 2 √ × 3 √ √ 4 √ √ 5 √ √ 6 √ × 7 √ √ 8 √ √ 9 √ √ 10 √ √
Attack scenarios
Scenario 1 -Attackless mode: This scenario corresponds to the normal behavior of the two-tank system when nobody is stealing water.
Scenario 2 -Short-term water theft from T 1 : This scenario is similar to a leakage fault, the only remarkable difference being that it is cast maliciously, with the purpose of stealing water from the tank T 1 . In this scenario, a pump extracts a constant flow Q f 1 = 10 −4 m 3 /s between t = 40 s and t = 80 s without any alteration of the measurements h m 1 and h m 2 . Note that in this scenario, the residuals behave similarly to the case of a sudden leak in the original fault diagnosis benchmark.
Scenario 3 -Short-term water theft from T 1 with hiding signal added to the measurement h m 1 : In this scenario, the thief uses a pump to extract water with a constant flow Q f 1 = 10 −4 m 3 /s between t = 40 s and t = 80 s while adding a signal to the output of the level sensor in tank T 1 so that the introduced signal hides the theft. Thanks to the introduced signal, the water level in tank T 1 seems to remain constant, and the PI controller works as if nothing had happened providing almost the same value U m p as in scenario 1. In particular, the modified value of h m 1 is given by
Scenario 4 -Long-term water theft from T 1 with hiding signal added to the measurement h m 1 : This attack scenario is similar to scenario 3, but the theft duration is extended from exhibits some physical functioning problems, since the tank T 1 is emptied out, affecting the tank T 2 due to the interconnection, and the consumption of water Q o , which becomes zero.
Scenario 5 -Long-term water theft from T 1 with small signal added to the measurement h m 1 : In this scenario, the thief will steal water as in the previous scenarios while adding a signal that deceives the PI controller to force more water to be pumped inside the system while making harder to detect the theft. In particular, the modified value of h m 1 is given by
Scenario 6 -Short-term water theft from T 2 : This attack scenario is similar to scenario 2, but it affects T 2 instead of T 1 .
Scenario 7 -Short-term water theft from T 2 with hiding signal added to the measurement h m 2 : This attack scenario is similar to scenario 3, but it affects T 2 instead of T 1 . In this case, the thief applies a constant signal Q f 2 = 10 −4 m 3 /s while adding a signal to the output of the level sensor in tank T 2 , which forces the ON-OFF controller to act on the interconnecting valve V b as if nothing had happened. In particular, the modified value of h m 2 is given by
Scenario 8 -Long-term water theft from T 2 with hiding signal added to the measurement h m 2 : This scenario is similar to scenario 4, but the pump corresponding to Q f 2 is used by the thief instead of the one corresponding to Q f 1 .
Scenario 9 -Long-term water theft from T 2 with small signal added to the measurement h m 2 : This scenario is similar to scenario 5, but the thief steals water from the tank T 2 and the introduced signal is meant to deceive the ON-OFF controller instead. In this case, the modified value of h m 2 is given by
Scenario 10 -Replay attack: In this scenario, the thief steals water when the plant has reached its steady-state. However, before doing so, he/she records the measurements coming from the sensors without stealing water from the tanks. Then, in a subsequent phase of the attack, the thief steals water while replacing the real data with the recorded one. This type of attack is very hard to detect, if not impossible, and for this reason alternative approaches must be employed, see e.g. (Mo and Sinopoli, 2009, Zhu and Martínez, 2014) . More specifically, the water is stolen from t = 160 s to t = 200 s, while measurements recorded in the 50 s previous to the attack are used to deceive the controller and the supervision system. At time t = 200 s, the replay attack ends and the controller and the supervision system are able to see the real data coming from the system.
Detection and isolation requirements
The effectiveness of different cyber attack detection and isolation techniques can be assessed using the proposed benchmark by comparing different performance indices. Such a comparison would be performed by applying Monte Carlo studies with a sufficient high number of simulations, each one of which corresponding to a different realisation of the measurement noise, independent from the previous ones. In particular, the effectiveness of the proposed techniques would be tested by checking their ability to provide information both about the effect of the attack being performed (detection) and the exact nature and location of the attack (isolation). Typical performance indices are:
• Attack detection time delay t AD : Time needed by the attack detection method to detect the presence of an attack, calculated from the time at which the attack begins; • Attack isolation time delay t AI : Time needed by the attack detection method to isolate whether the attack affects T 1 or T 2 , calculated from the time at which the attack begins; • False negative attack detection rate r FNAD : Percentage of time during which the system is under attack, but the detection method determines an attackless situation; • False positive attack detection rate r FPAD : Percentage of time during which the system is not being attacked, but the detection method determines that the system is under attack; • Wrong isolation rate r W IR : Percentage of time during which the isolation method provides a wrong information about which tank is being affected by the attack, calculated with respect to the overall time during which an isolation information is provided; • Attack estimation accuracy for tank i a AE,i : This index takes into account the difference between the real stolen water volume V f i , i = 1, 2, and the estimated stolen water volumeV f i , i = 1, 2, and it is calculated as
All these indices should be kept positive and as low as possible, in order to allow for the activation of policies or strategies to protect the system from the attacks. In addition, another requirement is the robustness of the proposed methods towards uncertainties in the model (e.g. due to unknown changes in the values listed in Table 1 ).
SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides the plots of some relevant variables that give more insight about the behavior of the benchmark in the proposed attack scenarios. Fig. 2 shows a comparison between the water levels in the tanks in scenarios 1 and 3. It can be seen that due to the hiding signal introduced by the thief, h m 1 in scenario 3 (yellow dashed line) matches h 1 in scenario 1 (blue solid line), which misleads in determining whether someone is stealing water from the tank or not. It can be seen that the real value of h 1 in scenario 3 (red solid line) plummets to a much lower value. On the other hand, Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the residuals r 1 and r 2 , which are calculated as in (12)-(13). Notably, r 1 and r 2 are useful for evaluating the presence of leakages in tanks T 1 and T 2 , respectively. In fact, they behave as expected (taking a value different than zero from t = 40 s to t = 80 s) in scenario 2 (red solid line) which, as stated in Section 3.1, is similar to a leakage fault. However, their values in scenario 3 (yellow dashed line) are approximately zero during the attack, which prevents traditional fault detection and isolation (FDI) algorithms from detecting correctly the presence of the attack. The water level responses in scenario 5 are shown and compared to the ones in scenario 1 in Fig. 4 . It can be seen that the signal h m 1 sent to the PI controler is similar, although not identical, to the real h 1 in scenario 1. This makes it harder to diagnose the water theft, as shown by the residuals depicted in Fig. 5 .
Finally, Fig. 6 presents the water level responses in scenarios 1 and 10 (replay attack). This is the hardest attack to detect, since the measured water levels in both tanks h m 1 and h m 2 are almost identical to the water levels h 1 and h 2 in the attackless scenario.
As a consequence, the residuals in scenario 10 during the replay attack are undistinguishable from the ones when no attack is being performed (see Fig. 7 ). When the replay attack ends, one can see a spike in the residuals due to the discontinuity between the received data during and after the replay attack. It is evident that alternative and innovative approaches must be investigated in order to detect earlier this kind of attacks.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a benchmark model for the detection of cyber attacks has been presented. The benchmark consists in a nonlinear system made up by two interconnected tanks. A malicious attacker, who has the goal of stealing water from the tanks while going unnoticed thanks to appropriate alterations of the outputs of the sensors, has been incorporated. Depending on the type of theft and the type of sensor alteration, different attack scenarios have been obtained, which simulate short-term and long-term water theft from both tanks. Simulation scenarios have been provided and discussed, highlighting some of the difficulties with detecting and isolating the proposed cyber attacks using traditional FDI techniques. The authors hope that the proposed benchmark will be useful to the scientific community for testing different kinds of cyber attack detection and isolation schemes. Furthermore, the authors encourage the design of secure controllers that improve the resilience of the system against these attacks.
